



**CHANGING CHALLENGES IN A SOLID ALLIANCE:
GREECE AND THE WESTERN PARTNERS
IN PAST AND PRESENT**

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Looking to the west

It is common knowledge that Greece is located in a strategic and often unstable geopolitical region. This is owed partly to geography, but mainly to the country's own historical efforts for nation- and state-building with a Mediterranean geostrategic identity.¹ This long-lasting purpose, including her unwavering engagement with the Western allies in both World Wars,² has often triggered external challenges and domestic battles of legitimacy regarding the decisions that could best serve the national interest.

Apart from the National Schism in the First World War,³ the Civil War that engulfed Greece after the Second World War⁴ determined the outcome of long-lasting domestic struggles and international antagonisms regarding

¹ Lena Divani, *The territorial integration of Greece, 1830-1947* (in Greek), Kastaniotis, Athens 2000. D. Douglas, *The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923*, Ernest Benn, London 1972.

² About the First World War see G.B. Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers 1914-1917*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1974. Y.G. Mourélos, *L' intervention de la Grèce dans le Grande Guerre (1916-1917)*, Institut Français d'Athènes, Athènes 1983. G. Leontaritis, *Greece in the First World War 1917-1918* (in Greek), MIET, Athens 2000. About the Second World War see P. Papastratis, *British Policy Towards Greece during the Second World War, 1941-1944*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984. C.M. Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949*, Ivan R. Dee, Chicago 2003. M. Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece, 1941-1944*, Yale University Press, New Haven & London 1995. C. Stockings and Eleanor Hancock, *Swastika over the Acropolis*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2013.

³ See G.Th. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1935*, University of California Press, Berkeley 1983. M. Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision in Greece, 1919-1922*, Allen Lane, London 1973.

⁴ L. Bærentzen, J. O. Iatrides, O. Langwitz Smith (eds.), *Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War*, Museum Tusulanum Press, Copenhagen 1987. J.O. Iatrides (ed.), *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis* (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1984. M. Mazower (ed.), *After the War was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation and Greece, 1943-1960*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2000.



the country's strategic alliances. These were solved in favor of the country's unquestionable orientation to the postwar "West" as the ultimate guarantee for national security and a precondition for long-term stability. At the same time, the importance of Greece's stability for Western security was only confirmed by the Civil War and the Cold War. Greece became the first "testing ground" of the Cold War that triggered the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan for the postwar reorganization of the "West" in the spirit of Euro-Atlantic cooperation.⁵ Accordingly, the country entered NATO in the second enlargement (1952), and was the first third country to be associated with the EEC in the beginning of the 1960s (Association Agreement of 1961/62).⁶ A recognition of the new security perception was the fact that –together with Turkey– Greece went in the early 1950s as far as to extend an indirect NATO aegis to Eastern bloc's maverick Yugoslavia through the Balkan Pact of 1953-54.⁷

The rapid postwar transformation of Greece from one of the poorest OEEC member countries into a stable democracy and a rich economy with a high degree of social cohesion and social mobility vindicated those strategic decisions. Like all Western Europeans that could finally breathe economically under NATO protection, Greeks experienced unprecedented growth and stability over many decades. Compared to the Balkan countries and Turkey, Greece profited the most from the Cold War and, in fact, became a role model

⁵ G. Stathakis, *The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan: the history of American aid in Greece* (in Greek), Vivliorama, Athens 2004. Th. Sfikas (ed.), *The Marshall Plan: the recovery and division of Europe* (in Greek), Patakis, Athens 2011. M.J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan, America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987.

⁶ About the Association with the EEC see Konstantina Botsiou, *Griechenlands Weg nach Europa. Von der Truman-Doktrin bis zur Assoziierung mit der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1947-1961*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M. 1999. About the accession to the European Communities see Eirini Karamouzi, *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974-1979: the second enlargement*, Palgrave/Macmillan, London 2014. About Greece's accession to NATO see E. Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952-1967*, Routledge, London 2006.

⁷ For both issues see D. Chourchoulis, *The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951-1959: Military Strategy of Political Stabilization*, Lexington Books, London 2014, 35-109. About the Balkan Pact see also J.O. Iatrides, *Balkan Triangle: Birth and Decline of an Alliance across Ideological Boundaries*, Mouton, The Hague & Paris 1968. Also, E. Hatzivassiliou, "From Adversity to Alliance: Greece, Yugoslavia and Balkan Strategy, 1944-1959", *Balkan Studies*, vol. 45, no 1, (2004), 123-133. See also Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia and the Cold War*, Peen State University Press, University Park 1993.

for the entire region showing what a country can achieve through NATO- and EC/EU-membership.⁸

In this “metamorphosis”⁹ the role of the Greek armed forces can be hardly overestimated. For the first time in the history of the Greek state, national security was linked on a long-term basis with the political commitment of a solid mutual defense pact (NATO) and the military guarantee of a Superpower (USA). Liberated from vital geopolitical anxieties, the Greek armed forces could seek for themselves separation from politics, international outlook and focus on national defense.¹⁰ In return, Greece contributed a high percentage of GDP to defense and she provided important military bases and facilities to the Western alliance. The legacy of Western orientation proved sustainable under many crises ever since, including the 7-year military rule (1967-1974) that temporarily affected the position of the armed forces. It also provided an enduring commitment to the West during times of transition, like the era of democratic rehabilitation in 1974-1975 and the post-2008 period of radical adjustment.

The Greek armed forces constituted traditionally a staunch advocate of Western orientation and a force of national modernization that enjoyed widespread legitimacy and respect in Greek public opinion. At the same time, they have guarded status-quo policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, based on systematic Greek-Turkish cooperation.¹¹

Undoubtedly, the Cyprus issue has complicated this geopolitical reality for over half a century. Even though the problem was initially activated as a

⁸ Eirini Karamouzi, “The Only Game in Town? EEC Southern Europe and the Greek Crisis in the 1970s”, in: S. Rajak, Konstantina E. Botsiou, Eirini Karamouzi and E. Hatzivassiliou (eds.), *The Balkans on the Cold War*, Palgrave/Macmillan, London 2017, 221-238. A. Westad, “The Balkans: A Cold war Mystery”, in: Rajak, Botsiou, Karamouzi, Hatzivassiliou (eds.), *The Balkans on the Cold War*, 355-362.

⁹ W.H. McNeill, *The Metamorphosis of Greece Since World War II* (in Greek), Papadopoulos, Athens 2017.

¹⁰ Concerning the defense organization of Greece in NATO’s Southern Flank see Chourchoulis, *The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951-1959*. About the emancipation of the armed forces from politics already in the Civil War see Konstantina E. Botsiou, “New Policies, Old Politics: American Concepts of Reform In Marshall Plan Greece”, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 27/2 (October 2009), 209-240. On the role of NATO for postwar Europe see S.R. Sloan, *Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain*, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2016.

¹¹ Chourchoulis, *The Southern Flank of NATO*, 147-183. J. Alford (ed.), *Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance*, International Institute for Strategic Studies/Aldershot, London 1984.



decolonization question, totally in agreement with the US (and Soviet) post-war decolonization agenda, it evolved, first, into a Greek-British problem and later into a Greek-Turkish dispute that often brought Greece in collision with her Western allies and to the brink of war with Turkey.¹² Moreover, it often undermined the position of pro-Western political forces in Greece vis-a-vis a vocal leftist opposition that based her post-civil war agenda on a hybrid rhetoric of internationalist anti-colonialism and nationalist irredentism. For decades, Greek public opinion remained vulnerable to economic overtures from the communist bloc and to the neutralistic sirens of the Non-Aligned Movement as Greece struggled to attract support from Third World countries for her Cyprus case in the United Nations Organization.¹³ The Cyprus issue started to dominate Greek political life in the 1950s. Among other implications, it was instrumental both in the imposition as well as in the fall of the Colonel's dictatorship (1967-1974).

But, despite, the negative legacy of the junta and Greece's withdrawal from the military branch of NATO in the aftermath of the second Turkish invasion in Cyprus (1974), the Western orientation of Greece was never essentially questioned either by Greek governments or by her strategic partners. Working with allies was only strengthened by Greece's accession to the European Community in 1979/81 and her re-integration in the military planning of NATO at the peak of the euro-missile crisis (1980).¹⁴ The undisturbed continuity of Greece's cooperation with Western Allies was only confirmed after the paradigm shift that was set in motion with the political victory of PASOK in 1981.¹⁵ Despite occasional anti-Western rhetoric and diplomatic deviations

¹² Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York 1992. Stefan Maximilian Brenner, *Die NATO im griechisch-türkischen Konflikt 1954 bis 1989*, DeGruyter, Oldenburg 2017. Regarding periods of extreme tension see P. Papapolyviou, A. Syrigos, E. Hatzivassiliou (eds.), *The Cyprus Issue and the International System, 1945-1974: seeking a place in the world* (in Greek), Patakis, Athens 2013. Konstantina E. Botsiou, "The Cyprus issue and the Greek political crisis, 1961-1967", 247-265, A. Theophanous, "The Turkish Invasion of 1974 and their implications in the search for a Cyprus settlement", 305-318 and G. Kazamias, "Strategic choices of the West on Cyprus, July-August 1974", 319-335.

¹³ Vrushali Patil, *Negotiating Decolonization in the United Nations*, Routledge, London 2008. J. Ker-Lindsay, "Shifting alignments: the external orientation of Cyprus since independence", *The Cyprus Review*, 22/2 (2010), 67-74.

¹⁴ J. Chipman (ed.), *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Changes*, Routledge, London 1988, 341-342.

¹⁵ L. Lafeber, "The Socialist Experience in Greece", *International Journal of Political Economy*, 194/4 (1989-90), 32-55. R. Clogg (ed.), *Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade*, Macmillan, London 1993. K. Featherstone (ed.), *Policy and Politics in Greece*, Routledge, London 2006.

from Western orthodoxy, neither European integration under the centre-right Karamanlis governments of the 1970s nor financial re-distribution under the socialists in the 1980s led to a change in foreign and security policy. Due to her geostrategic position, Greece also continued to be –at times puzzlingly– a valuable ally of the West in the dialogue with the Arab countries.¹⁶

Security and insecurities after the cold war

The Greek armed forces and Greece’s military alliances became even more crucial when the end of the Cold War “unfroze” contested issues in Europe originating even as back as the First World War: most telling became immediately the wars of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.¹⁷ The end of the Cold War brought also new and diverse threats to the fore with Islamic terrorism and non-state actors emerging as the gravest and most unpredictable ones. Greece was not directly exposed to these challenges, but she felt more acutely as a “frontline state”: between symmetric and asymmetric threats, conventional and hybrid warfare, Balkan and Middle East instability.

Insecurity grew first of all from the fact that Greece was anchored in the camp of status-quo countries that had deemed border inviolability as tantamount to border unchangeability since the 1975 Final Helsinki Act.¹⁸ Transition to a world where border change does happen was generally considered a menace, not an opportunity. The negative hypotheses have been only confirmed by various crises and wars since the 1990s, from the Balkans to the Middle East and the Ukraine, whereas they gradually touched upon Turkey, which is a member country of NATO.¹⁹ Ankara’s recurrent revisionist demands in the Aegean Sea since the 1970s expanded into a full revisionist agenda regarding the Lausanne Treaty (1923) under the heavy shadow of the Syrian war. Taking into account the revisionist approaches of other actors in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea that seek to change historical

¹⁶ For an overview see C. Rozakis, “Greek Foreign Policy, 1981-1990”, in: *History of the Greek Nation* (in Greek), vol. 16, Ekdotiki, Athens 2000, 371-391. J. Sakkas, *Greece in the Mediterranean 1950-2004: Foreign Policy and Regional Disputes* (in Greek), SEAB, Athens 2015, 35-50.

¹⁷ Catherine Baker, *The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s*, Palgrave/Macmillan, London 2015.

¹⁸ D.C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights and the Demise of Communism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2001. O. Bange & G. Niedhart (eds.), *Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe*, Berghahn, New York 2008.

¹⁹ A. Wilson, *Ukraine crisis: What it means for the West*, Yale University Press, New Haven 2014.



borders and identities, Greece can legitimately weigh the risk of a destabilizing domino effect in the entire region. This pressure put Greece's security reflexes to the test, as it is combined with pressure from domestic economic failure and mass migration from the unstable near abroad.²⁰ An additional challenge comes from the post-Cold War geopolitical re-shuffle in the Western Balkans²¹

The current new prospect of full NATOization at the Adriatic coast promises to create, for the first time in history, political and defense continuity between Greece and her allies in Western Europe. Still, the issue of FYROM that mostly concerns Greece cannot be separated from the prospect of a viable arrangement between Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The difficulties in this triangle perplex the situation at the Greek borders. Greece needs to avoid the risk of a marginalized Serbia with open issues around her that would become a "black hole" gravitating revisionist influences to the entire region.²² The FYROM problem is therefore viewed as an important, but not a decisive factor for a full geopolitical Westernization of the Western Balkans.

Greece lies at the crossroads of three major interconnected tectonic plates: the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East. As the only country in the Balkan peninsula with access to the Aegean Sea –except from Turkey's access– she is traditionally cautious towards shifting geopolitics. Not unjustifiably so. In today's context, she faces direct security pressures from Turkey in Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea as well as irredentist nationalism from FYROM and Albania. It is only natural for Greece to seek stability in alliances that have historically worked for her, notably, the USA, NATO and the EU, or can

²⁰ Ismini A. Lamb, "Refugees and Policy Choices", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 27, no 2 (2016), 67-88. Tina Mavrikos-Adamos, "Immigration Laws and the Politics of Migration in Greece", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 28, no 2 (2017), 30-52. For a general study on modern refugee issues see also H. Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012.

²¹ S. Sfetas, *Aspects of the Macedonian issue in the 20th century* (in Greek), Vanias, Thessaloniki 2001. A very important contribution to the analysis of the issue is the classical book by E. Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1964.

²² Z. Brzezinski, "Putin's Choice", *The Washington Quarterly*, 31/2 (2008). Lilia Shevtsova, "Forward to the Past in Russia", *Journal of Democracy*, 26/2 (2015). For an analysis of this concept of Russia as opposed to the West see also M. Stuermer, *Putin and the Rise of Russia*, Pegasus, New York 2009. S. White, *Understanding Russian Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011.

work from now on, like the cooperation with Israel and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus is an integral part of both old and new alliances.²³

Greece has every reason to support Euro-Atlantic enlargement in the Western Balkans in order to overcome her geopolitical loneliness in the region. Having an unbroken historical record of Western orientation, she also represents, against all odds, a prominent success story of the West. Hence, the right way to stabilize the region runs through the stability of Greece, including the respect of national identities. As history has shown, taking local identities out of geopolitics can hardly provide viable solutions in Europe without the risk of opening dangerous revisionist chapters in Europe beyond.

Strategy and political legitimacy have always been the two sides of the same coin in the Western system of security ever since the Second World War. They maintain their relevance to this very day, for allies need to balance allied unity with national interest. Economic capabilities and social cohesion are prerequisites for national strategic planning and allied cooperation. Comparable economic and political organization helps allies develop similar threat perceptions and coordinated responses to common threats. To this end, especially NATO improved over the years joint educational and informational programs that smooth out differences before resorting to action. Small member countries have mostly welcomed such policies as a major gain of membership that fills in the gaps of national capabilities. In the contemporary vocabulary, countries like Greece attach great importance to military and force interoperability. The same goes for standardization on all three levels of compatibility, interchangeability and commonality.²⁴

These elements can greatly facilitate the mission of Rapid Reaction Forces and Joint Multilateral Operations. In terms of cohesion and legitimization one should also take into consideration their growth effect on national technological, intelligence and arms industry potential. All three

²³ J. Abadi, "Constraints and Adjustments in Greece's Policy toward Israel", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 11, no 1 (2000), 40-70. T. Cariotis, "Hydrocarbons and the Law of the Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for Cyprus, Greece and Turkey", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 22/2 (2011), 45-56. Cp. A. Murat Agdemir, "A New Partnership in the Eastern Mediterranean: The growing relations between Israel and Greece", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 26/4 (2015), 49-68.

²⁴ S.J. Maranian, *Interoperability: Sustaining Trust and Capacity within the Alliance*, NATO Defense College, Rome 2015. Rebecca R. Moore and D. Coletta (eds.), *NATO's Return to Europe. Engaging Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond*, Georgetown University Press, Washington 2017, 97-112, 135-218.



are today priorities for the Greek armed and political forces. Enhanced exchange of information and know-how can only strengthen allied ties and interdependence. It is also a prerequisite for updated responses to threats that can become national and allied concerns by smaller country members. As a pillar of stability between the Western Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece will need all information she can get from her allies in order to retain this position and export stability in the neighboring countries. The same is true regarding also more recent partners in the region, particularly Egypt and Israel. Apart from military security, economic, transportation and energy security are fundamental for serving national and allied priorities at the crossroads.

Greece has yet thorny issues with neighbors that seek to become NATO allies and/or EU members, basically FYROM, Albania and Turkey. Additionally, the EU prospects of other Balkan countries, e.g. Serbia or Montenegro, cannot leave her indifferent.²⁵ Evidently, Greece expects to be involved in the regional political and security planning of the Western organizations and let her positions be expressed through local and regional initiatives. Certainly, her own major threat perceptions put her more closely to West European countries which underline the refugee and economic crises rather than East European countries that emphasize the Russian menace. Greece lies at the center of both dichotomies: on the North-South divide as to the intensity perception of the Russian threat; on the East-West divide as to the intensity of the refugees and the economic crisis. From this point of view, Greece presents a political laboratory of Europe.

EU defense and security offer a second parallel level for developing defense capabilities and enhancing operation readiness. The connection of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence) with the European Defense Fund (EDF), promising major investments on research and capability building, is a significant incentive for security stability and growth. But, above all, it is linked with the political axiom that the country needs to follow the “first speed” of European integration, that is to participate in all European structures. This strategy is historically driven by the memory of unstable and unreliable ad hoc alliances before the Second World War, but it is also connected with the unique security effect that integration provides to smaller member countries. Since Greek borders are the borders of the EU

²⁵ S. Darmanović, “The Never-Boring Balkans: The Elections of 2016”, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 28, no 1 (2017), 116-128. F. Kovacevic, “Montenegro and the Politics of Postcommunist Transition: 1990 to 2006”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vo. 18, no 1 (2007), 72-93.

and NATO, it seems ideal for translating this into EU institutions. Definitely, NATO remains the security backbone.

The economic crisis has unavoidably affected the ease of making investments across the entire state apparatus. Military investment is no exception to this. Yet, the crisis has left unaffected the resourcefulness of the Greek armed forces to keep the defense capabilities intact through smart re-prioritization, investment on the human factor and use of allied support – economic, technical, operational and educational. Regarding education, more systematic general education is becoming indispensable, especially in the fields of humanities and social sciences. The demand is already there if one looks at the numbers of officers' enrollment in such programs.²⁶ It indicates a need for deeper understanding of the social and international complexities of the modern world in which officers have to consult with colleagues and political actors, take and communicate decisions. Humanities are extremely important to help officers solve moral dilemmas when dealing with modern threats and warfare.

The high educational and morale level of the Greek officer has traditionally been a great advantage of the Greek armed forces. Inter-generational solidarity is strong despite the canon of early retirement. Except from the private sector, retired officers support the expansion of the educational spectrum of younger ones instead of insisting on a closed militaries-only culture that once existed. The opening-up to the academia, political personnel, education and communication experts is a genuine re-education strategy for both sides of the table, namely the military and the non-military actors.

All the above apply, of course, to all armed forces. Ground forces are not only the largest armed service branch, but also the one enjoying the highest visibility and familiarity in Greek society. This is not just a matter of historical legacy because of the nature of national liberation wars. It shows the added value of Ground Forces in Civil Protection within Greece as well as its prestige as the guarantor of stability in relation with other NATO Balkan countries, especially Albania and Turkey, despite occasionally rocky relations.

The Armed Forces play a decisive role in guaranteeing the stability framework in which democracy can be secure and war unthinkable in the Balkans and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, they hold the key to

²⁶ See e.g. the Hellenic National Defense College, <https://setha.army.gr/el/content/programma-spydon>




the mutual communication of national goals to the allies and allied goals to the national level. This is the first step before the political players come in. Military analysis offers the decisive groundwork for political decisions and for social mobilization, that is for the crucial decision makers for war and peace.



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Books (suggestively)

1. *Griechenlands Weg nach Europa: Von der Truman-Doktrin bis zur Assoziierung mit der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1947 – 1961*, Frankfurt a.M: Peter Lang Verlag, 1999

2. *International Relations and Strategy in the Nuclear Era, Salonica, Paratiritis 2000* (ed. with Giannis Valinakis).

3. *Greece and the European Future of Turkey* (ed. with P. Kazakos, P. Liargovas, N. Marias, K. Polychronaki), I. Sideris, Athens 2001.

4. *Between NATO and the European Economic Community: Europe in search of a defensive and political unity, 1949-1956*, Athens, Papazissis, 2002

5. *EU Integration and the Future of Southeastern Europe* (Ed. with C. Arvanitopoulos & B.Lamers), Athens/Berlin, I. Sideris 2003

6. *Konstantinos Karamanlis in the twentieth century* (rev. with Constantinos Svolopoulos and E. Hatzivassiliou) 3 volumes, Athens, Rodakio, 2008

7. *Writing Books of Parliamentary Talks* (rev.), Athens, Hellenic Parliament Foundation for Parliamentarism and Democracy, Athens, 2010

8. *The Founders of European Integration, Athens, 2013* (ed. with Constantinos Svolopoulos)

9. *Greece, the West and the Mediterranean Sea, 1942-1962* (rev. with G. Sakkas), University of Macedonia, 2015

10. *The Balkans in the Cold War* (ed. with S. Rajak, E. Karamouzi, E. Hatzivassiliou), London, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2017



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Δίδαξε στο Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Δημόσιας Διοίκησης του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών, ως Ειδική Επιστήμων (1999-2003) και ως Λέκτορας Νεότερης και Σύγχρονης Ιστορίας (2003-2008). Ήταν συντονίστρια της ενότητας “Southeast European History and Culture, 19th-20th centuries” του αγγλόγλωσσου Προγράμματος Μεταπτυχιακών Σπουδών “Southeast European Studies” του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών (2000-2008) και μέλος της συντονιστικής επιτροπής του Προγράμματος (2006-2008). Την ίδια περίοδο δίδαξε στα μεταπτυχιακά προγράμματα «Ευρωπαϊκές και Διεθνείς Σπουδές» (1998-2004) και «Πολιτική Επιστήμη και Κοινωνιολογία» (2004-2008) του Τμήματος Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Δημόσιας Διοίκησης του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών.

Από το 2008 διδάσκει στο Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Διεθνών Σχέσεων του Πανεπιστημίου Πελοποννήσου και το 2011-12 υπηρέτησε ως Αναπληρώτρια Πρόεδρος του Τμήματος. Από το 2012 έως το 2015 διετέλεσε Αντιπρύτανης του Πανεπιστημίου Πελοποννήσου: από το 2012 έως το 2013 Αντιπρύτανης Οικονομικού Προγραμματισμού, από το 2013 έως το 2015 Αναπληρώτρια Πρύτανη Εκπαίδευσης και Διασφάλισης Ποιότητας και Πρόεδρος της ΜΟΔΙΠ του Ιδρύματος.

Διηύθυνε ερευνητικά και επιστημονικά προγράμματα στην Έδρα Jean Monnet για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ολοκλήρωση του Πανεπιστημίου Tübingen (1993-1995), στο ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ (1998-1999), στο Ευρωπαϊκό Κέντρο Jean Monnet του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών, όπου υπηρέτησε ως Αναπληρώτρια Διευθύντρια (2006-2008), στο Εθνικό Οπτικοακουστικό Αρχείο και στο Υπουργείο Προστασίας του Πολίτη.

Διηύθυνε τη σύνταξη του περιοδικού *Φιλελεύθερη Έμφαση* (2001-2011) και τις σειρές *Yearbook* και *European and International Affairs* του εκδοτικού οίκου Springer (2009-2011). Έχει συνεργαστεί ως συντονίστρια εκδόσεων και κριτής με πολλά ελληνικά και διεθνή περιοδικά, ενώ έχει επίσης συμμετάσχει σε ιστορικά ντοκυμαντέρ για τη σύγχρονη ελληνική ιστορία στην Ελλάδα και στο εξωτερικό. Έχει διδάξει στη Σχολή Ναυτικού Πολέμου, στη Σχολή Εθνικής Άμυνας και στη Διπλωματική Ακαδημία του Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών.

Έχει συμμετάσχει ως μέλος στο Εφορευτικό Συμβούλιο της Εθνικής Βιβλιοθήκης της Ελλάδος, στο Εκπαιδευτικό Συμβούλιο της Διπλωματικής Ακαδημίας του Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών και στο Επιστημονικό Συμβούλιο του Ιδρύματος της Βουλής των Ελλήνων για τον Κοινοβουλευτισμό και τη Δημοκρατία. Στο Ινστιτούτο Δημοκρατίας Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής διετέλεσε συντονίστρια Εκδόσεων και Ερευνητικών προγραμμάτων (2001-2009), Γενική Διευθύντρια (2009-2011) και Αντιπρόεδρος του Διοικητικού Συμβουλίου (2011-2014).

Έχει λάβει υποτροφίες από το ΙΚΥ, το πρόγραμμα Erasmus, το δίκτυο ECTS, και το Ίδρυμα «Κωνσταντίνος Γ. Καραμανλής», ενώ έχει τιμηθεί με το βραβείο «Στρατής Ανδρεάδης» και το βραβείο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης Εκπαιδευτικών.

Έχει διατελέσει μέλος του Επιστημονικού Συμβουλίου του Centre for European Studies (2011-2014) και εταίρος του Προγράμματος Διεθνών Σχέσεων Νότιας Ευρώπης των Ερευνητικών Κέντρων IDEAS, Διεθνών Σχέσεων, Διπλωματίας και Στρατηγικής του London School for Economics.

Μιλά αγγλικά, γερμανικά, ιταλικά, γαλλικά

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